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The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on an
Indigent Capital Defendant's Due
Process Right to a Jury Consultant
Kate Early*

INTRODUCTION

The presumption of innocence, the idea that every man is
innocent until proven guilty, is deeply rooted within every
American and central to our judicial system. However, it seems
that the media conveniently forgets about this mantra when
covering the most publicized crimes. Every so often, the media
becomes preoccupied with certain criminal defendants, their
The media begins by
stories, and their alleged crimes.
broadcasting the circumstances surrounding a gruesome crime in
grave detail and, sooner or later, they center in on one person that
is accused as being the assailant. The effects of this pretrial
publicity can be detrimental to more than just the reputation of
the accused.
Pretrial publicity may have an enormous impact on a criminal
defendant's right to a fair trial. The Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the
right to an impartial jury. 1 Moreover, the Due Process Clauses in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ensure the defendant is
* Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2011; B.A.
Quinnipiac University, 2008. I would like to thank the 2010 and 2011 editors
of the Roger Williams University Law Review for their patience and guidance
in the creation of this Comment. I would also like to thank my family and
friends for their never-ending love and support. Last, but certainly not least,
I would like to thank Michael Menard because his continuous devotion,
encouragement, and comic relief made this Comment possible.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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accorded a fair trial.2
Pretrial publicity, unless assuaged,
contravenes these assurances. 3 There are several different
remedial measures a trial judge may employ to moderate the
impact of the publicity. 4 One of the more significant procedures 5to
determine and eliminate biases is voir dire of prospective jurors.
Effective jury selection is of vital importance, especially when
pretrial publicity has occurred. Jury consultants can help to
ensure an impartial jury is empanelled and, therefore, preserve
the defendant's right to a fair trial. 5 As a result, jury consultants
are being sought after and employed in an increasing number of
cases. 7
However, wealthy defendants are at a significant
advantage over their underprivileged counterparts, given that
jury consultant services are pricey.
Indigent criminal defendants have the right to an expert
under the fundamental fairness doctrine, 8 which is the principle
underlying procedural due process. 9 Though originally recognized
for psychiatric evaluations, this right has been expanded to other
areas of expertise. 10 As a result, indigent defendants have argued
that this right extends to jury consultant services." Few have

2.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see

generally Steven C. Serio, Comment, A Process Right Due? Examining
Whether a Capital Defendant has a Due Process Right to a Jury Selection
Expert, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1143, 1167-69 (2004).
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. See infra Part II.B.2.
6. See infra Parts I.C.2 and IV.
7. Id.
8. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 77 (1985) (holding that a
defendant had a constitutional right to a state-appointed psychiatrist where
he demonstrated that his sanity at the time of the offense was going to be a
significant factor at trial). The fundamental-fairness doctrine is "[t]he rule
that applies the principles of due process to a judicial proceeding. The term
is commonly considered synonymous with due process." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 697 (8th ed. 2006).
9. "Due process is the observance of that fundamental fairness which is
essential to the very concept of justice; it rests on basic fairness of procedure
and demands a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties
involved." 16C C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw §1436 (2009).
10. See infra Part III.B (discussing the expansion of expert services to
include forensic pathology, blood spatter, DNA, fingerprinting, intoxication
and dentistry).
11. See infra Part IV.
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been successful, but many others have not been so lucky. 12
This Comment seeks to examine the problems presented by
extensive pretrial publicity and the necessity of proficient jury
selection in those cases. Moreover, this Comment recognizes the
failure of the majority of courts to afford indigent defendants a
jury consultant under the Ake v. Oklahoma 13 standard. This
Comment further argues that an indigent capital defendant has a
due process right to a jury consultant where the case has received
substantial pretrial publicity.
Part I of this Comment explains the constitutional and
statutory standards associated with jury selection. Part I also
describes the jury consulting industry and how jury consultant
services can moderate the effects caused by pretrial publicity.
Part II begins by describing research evidencing the prejudicial
effect pretrial publicity has on the potential jury pool. Then, Part
II goes on to discuss the remedial measures courts may take to
dispel bias caused by publicity and argues that voir dire plays a
pivotal role in ensuring a fair trial. Part III outlines the continued
expansion of the right to an expert with a detailed look at Ake v.
Oklahoma.14 Finally, Part IV applies the test formulated in Ake
to evaluate whether a right to a jury consultant exists. This
Comment asserts that courts should recognize a due process right
to a jury consultant in capital cases where the case has received
substantial publicity.
I. THE AMERICAN JURY
A. The Constitutional Standard
The role of the jury is firmly rooted within our society and,
more importantly, within our Constitution. 15 Our forefathers
found juries to be such an essential part of the criminal justice
system that the right to a trial by jury was incorporated into the
United States Constitution. 16 Not only does the Constitution
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by jury, but it

12.

Id.

13.
14.
15.
16.

470 U.S. 68 (1985).

Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See id.
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also requires that the jury be impartial. 17 This has been
interpreted to include the right of having the pool of jurors drawn
from a fair cross section of the community. 18 The jury that is
actually selected is not required to precisely mirror the
community, so long as the venire from which the jury is drawn is
reasonably representative thereof. 19
Furthermore, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 20 and
Fourteenth 2 1 Amendments of the United States Constitution have
been interpreted to require that the defendant have "a panel of
impartial, indifferent jurors."22 This requires that the jurors be
unbiased. In trials involving defendants who have received
substantial pre-trial publicity, this standard becomes a central
issue in determining whether the defendant has been afforded his
constitutional right to an impartial jury.
B. The Jury Selection Procedure
1. The Venire23
In accordance with the Constitution, federal law 24 imposes
similar requirements on the jury venire. Federal law requires
that the venire be chosen at random from a fair cross section of
the community in the district where the court was committed.
Potential jurors are chosen through voter registration lists and
called for service on a specified date. 2 6 Potential jurors must meet
certain specifications in order to qualify as a juror; 27 furthermore,
jurors may be excused or exempted from service based on a
17. Id.
18. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
19. Based on this requirement, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that state laws that systematically eliminate distinct classes from the jury
venire are unconstitutional. See id.; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
23. The venire is the pool of potential jurors selected to be considered as
part of the twelve-person-jury.

24. See The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-66
(2006). States impose their own requirements on selecting their venire. See
e.g. R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-9-1 (2009).
25.

The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006).

26.
27.

Id. § 1863.
Id. § 1865.
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number of varying factors. 28 Persons that qualify and are not
excused or exempted from service will be questioned during voir
dire. The voir dire process permits the judge and attorneys to
question the potential jurors in order to determine whether the
jurors possess any biases or prejudices concerning the relevant
29
parties and facts in the case.
2. ChallengingProspectiveJurors
Attorneys are permitted to utilize two types of challenges in
their attempt to strike a potential juror: 1) challenges for cause
and 2) peremptory challenges. 30 If it becomes clear during the
voir dire process that a potential juror cannot be fair and
impartial because of a particular opinion or belief, the attorney
may challenge the juror for cause. 31 However, in order to be valid,
the challenge for cause must be based on "narrowly specified,
provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality." 32 Once a
challenge is made, the trial judge has broad discretion to decide
33
whether or not to excuse that juror.
Peremptory challenges afford attorneys more flexibility since
the strike can be utilized without cause or explanation. 34 The
rationale underlying peremptory challenges is that they will aid in
selecting a fair and impartial jury by allowing attorneys to strike
potential jurors whose bias is less demonstrable. 35 Peremptory
challenges are limited in accordance with the type of criminal
charge involved.3 6 Thus, in a capital case, each side is permitted
twenty challenges; 37 while only three peremptory strikes are

28. Id. § 1866.
29. See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 129-30
(2003).
30. The term "jury selection" seems to indicate that the attorneys are
choosing which jurors should be empanelled.
In reality, however, the
attorneys are selecting who should not be empanelled by striking jurors from
the venire.
31. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); see also JONAKAIT,
supranote 29, at 134-35.
32. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
33. See JONAKAIT, supra note 29, at 135.
34. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.

35.

See id.

36.
37.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(1).
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38

permitted where the charge is a misdemeanor.
Traditionally, attorneys have been in control of challenging
However, an increasing number of
jurors during voir dire.
to jury consultants for their expertise in
attorneys are turning
39
selecting a jury.
C. The Jury Consulting Industry
1. Origin and Popularityof Jury Science and Jury Consulting
In 1971, "jury science ' 40 and the jury consulting industry
emerged during the prosecution of the "Harrisburg Seven."4 1 A
group of anti-Vietnam War activists were on trial for acts of civil
disobedience; one act in particular involved a conspiracy to kidnap
Henry Kissinger and to destroy draft records. 42 Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, a predominantly conservative district, was chosen
to be the setting for trial.4 3 The defense hired a team of social
scientists who utilized telephone polls to collect information
The
regarding the residents' perspectives on the war.4
consultants then analyzed the data to determine a profile of the
type of juror who would most likely be sympathetic or
unsympathetic to the defendants. 45 The defense selected a jury in
accordance with the consultants' profile,4 6 and the trial ended
47
with a hung jury.
Ever since the trial of the "Harrisburg Seven," scientific jury
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(3).
39. See Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers:A
Study of the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and
What, if Anything, to do About it, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 441, 464 (1999).
40. The practice of using a scientific approach to jury selection. See
generally Jeremy W. Barber, Note, The Jury is Still Out: The Role of Jury
Science in the Modern American Courtroom, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 123039 (1994).
41. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 444.
42. Id. at 444; United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir.
1973).
43. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 444.
44. Rachel Hartje, Comment, A Jury of Your Peers?: How Jury
Consulting May Actually Help Trial Lawyers Resolve Constitutional
Limitations Imposed on the Selection of Juries, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 479, 491-92
(2005).
45. Id.; Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 444.
46. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 444.
38.

47.

JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL

OF DEMOCRACY 157 (1994). The jurors voted 10-2 in favor of acquittal. Id.
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selection has become increasingly popular. 4 8 The industry began
to grow immediately, with criminal defendants employing jury
consultants in the 1970s leading to a string of acquittals. 49 Not
long after, large corporate defendants and high-profile figures
turned to jury consultants in search of favorable results.50 The
American Society of Trial Consultants (ASTC) estimates that by
1994 there were at least 250 jury consultants in the United
States.51 By 1994, the industry had exploded to almost twelve
times its size compared to eleven years earlier when there were
only nineteen consultants. 52 Today, the ASTC Membership
Directory lists 394 consultants, evidencing continuous growth in
53
the industry.
2. The Profession Today: What Do Jury ConsultantsDo?
Jury consultants offer a wide range of services that are
derived from social science methods and can be useful to attorneys
throughout the litigation process. 54 At the beginning of a case,
services include assisting with jury selection by helping to
determine the ideal juror. 55 Jury consulting services progress
through trial as well by assisting in the development
of a trial
56
strategy and in determining how to present evidence.
However, the most infamous services jury consultants offer
are jury research and assistance with jury selection. 57 Jury
consultants collect information and establish a profile of the ideal

48. See id. at 148-49.
49. Id. at 148.
50. Id. at 149. Examples include: IBM, MCI, Pennzoil Company,
Firestone, and the National Football League. Id. In addition, two of

President Nixon's cabinet members hired jury consultants and were
acquitted during the Watergate scandal in 1974. Id.

51. Id.
52. Barber, supra note 40, at 1234.
53. See American Society of Trial Consultants, Consultant Locator,
http://www.astcweb.org (click "Consultant Locator" hyperlink on left; then
follow "Locate Consultant" hyperlink).
54. See Hartje, supra note 44, at 493.
55. Barber, supra note 40, at 1234-36
56. Id. at 1237-38; ABRAMSON, supra note 47, at 151-153.
Jury
consultants also assist attorneys prepare their case for trial in what might be
termed "scientific jury preparation. ABRAMSON, supra note 47, at 151.
57. See Hartje, supranote 44, at 493.
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Guided by this information,
juror for a particular case. 58
jurors who fail to meet the
attorneys will strike those potential
59
criteria described in the profile.
Collecting the information for a profile can occur using
61
60
Primarily, jury consultants use opinion polls
various methods.
(like those used in the trial for the "Harrisburg Seven") to
construct their profiles.6 2 Opinion polls are generally conducted
over the telephone or in person, and they are used to uncover
attitudes and biases of the residents of the jurisdiction. 63 The
questions asked include general questions regarding the
individual's attitudes relating to various factors, as well as specific
In doing so, the
questions relating to the case at hand.6 4
and
he will take this
consultant tries to "get a feel for local biases,"
65
into account when constructing the profile.
The consultants then analyze the data they have collected
through the surveys and try to find correlations between desirable
Once the
attitudes and an individual's characteristics. 66
correlations are established, profiles of the most and least
favorable jurors are constructed.6 7 During voir dire, potential
jurors are ranked in accordance with the profile constructed from
the survey results. 68 Each potential juror is given a numeric
on
the
instance,
one
through
five-based
value-for
69
The
characteristics he possesses that correspond to the profiles.
defense would then ideally strike the jurors labeled as a "five"
(those least likely to be sympathetic to the defendant), and the
58. Barber, supranote 40, at 1234-39.
59. Maureen E. Lane, Note, Twelve Carefully Selected Not So Angry
Men: Are Jury Consultants Destroying the American Legal System?, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 463, 473 (1999).

60. See Barber, supra note 40, at 1234-36.
61. Hartje, supra note 44, at 493-94.
62. Barber, supranote 40, at 1235.
63. Lane, supra note 59, at 473 (citing Barber, supra note 40, at 123536).
64. Hartje, supranote 44, at 494.
65. Barber, supra note 40, at 1235 (quoting Robert F. Hanley, Getting to
Know You, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 865, 871 (1990)).
66. Hartje, supra note 44, at 494. Characteristics include "a person's
age, race, religion, sex, political affiliations, occupations, habits, and social
standing." Id.
67.

Id.

68.
69.

Barber, supra note 40, at 1235.
Id.
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prosecution would presumably strike most of the "ones" (those
most likely to be in favor of the defense). 70 Subsequently, those
potential jurors tagged as a "two," "three," or a "four" are managed
individually, while keeping the ranking in mind. 7 1 Thus, the goal
is to determine and to remove those jurors most likely to be
unsympathetic to your side based upon the characteristics they
72

possess.

Of course, attorneys have long utilized this method of ranking
in selecting a jury. 73 However, the underlying technique for
determining which jurors are more likely to be sympathetic has
improved with the help of jury consultants. 74 Without the aid of a
jury consultant, an attorney is merely speculating by relying on
his instincts, or, at best, making an educated guess about the
potential jurors' viewpoints. 75 Conversely, a jury consultant has
researched the jury pool in advance and has ascertained
correlations tending to show particular characteristics that
correspond with viewpoints. 76 Thus, a ranking scale founded on
data collected by a jury consultant is more likely to be accurate
and less likely to be arbitrary. 77 Moreover, jury consultants have
been found to be accurate in their ability to 78predict individual
juror's attitudes based upon the ranking scales.
Another way jury consultants assist during jury selection is
through in-court assessment. 79 Jury consultants observe the
jurors' non-verbal and verbal communication during voir dire and
can analyze each juror's subtle gestures.8 0 For instance, a juror
who "sits rigidly and responds in a laconic tone with monosyllabic
answers to the voir dire might be an 'authoritarian' personality
and thus likely to side with the prosecution." 8 1 Moreover, jury
70.
71.

Id.

72.
73.

See Lane, supranote 59, at 473.
Barber, supra note 40, at 1235.

Id.

74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77.

Id; Hartje, supranote 44, at 497.

78. See Jeffrey T. Frederick, Social Science Involvement in Voir Dire:
Preliminary Data on the Effectiveness of "Scientific Jury Selection," 2 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 375, 391 (1984).
79.
80.
81.

Barber, supra note 40, at 1236.
Id.
Id.
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consultants carefully word questions in order to elicit certain
82
physical reactions and, therefore, ascertain jurors' attitudes.
Attorneys have also used non-verbal and verbal cues to
determine jurors' attitudes for a long time. 83 Just as with ranking
scales, however, a jury consultant's assessment is likely to be
more reliable than an attorney's educated guess. 84 A jury
consultant's education and occupation revolves around studying
Consequently, a jury
and predicting human behavior. 85
consultant is likely to be better equipped to accurately8 6assess a
juror's verbal and nonverbal behaviors than an attorney.
While jury selection is an important aspect of every jury trial,
jury selection becomes even more critical where pretrial publicity
has occurred. Pretrial publicity may taint the venire; therefore,
being able to weed out the biased jurors from the impartial is
essential.
II. PRETRIAL PUBLICITY

A. Pretrial Publicity Impacts a Juror's Ability to Remain Fair and
Impartial
While it may be true that the majority of criminal cases do not
receive much media attention, unique crimes and circumstances
produce cases with which the media becomes preoccupied. Once
the story breaks, the media keeps the public up-to-date with the
facts surrounding the crime, the investigation, the potential
suspect(s), and the victim(s). A recent example of this includes
Phillip Markoff, otherwise known as the "Craigslist Killer."
Markoff, a twenty-three year old medical student, was indicted for
brutally attacking three unsuspecting women he met through
88
Craigslist. 87 He was also accused of murdering one of them.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. See Matt Collette, Charges Expand in Hotel Killing 'Craigslist'
Suspect Indicted on 7 Counts: 'Craigslist'Case Adds Gun Counts, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, June 22, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 11894542.

88. Id. The author does not intend to downplay the severity of these
accusations, nor does she mean to suggest that Markoff was, in fact, innocent.
Nonetheless, Markoff was entitled to receive a fair trial and to remain
"innocent until proven guilty," but the media's portrayal contravened these
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The media kept the public informed about Markoff, even before he
was arrested. 89 They also leaked crucial information regarding
the crime, including some incriminating evidence. 90 Of course, the
media is entitled to publish these stories and keep the public
informed; 9 1 however, making this information readily
available to
92
the public can potentially contaminate the jury pool.
Pretrial publicity has been shown to have various
psychological effects causing the juror to be biased, even
inadvertently, in their decision. 9 3 Pretrial publicity, especially
negative pretrial publicity, causes jurors to create a negative
impression of the defendant, which consequently causes jurors to
view the defendant as less credible. 94 This can have severe
impacts where his defense hinges on his credibility. Moreover,
jurors do not lay aside or forget the information that they learned
through the media as they are told to do. 9 5 Rather, the jurors are
prone to source-memory errors, 9 6 where the jurors view the
information they learned through the media as if it had been
presented as evidence at the trial because they forget the source of
the information. 97 In this way, the pretrial publicity may have a
direct effect on the outcome of the trial because the information is
assurances. Tragically, Markoff committed suicide in prison on August 15,
2010, so he will never receive a fair trial or have the chance to clear his name.
See Maria Cramer, Markoff an apparent suicide, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.16,

2010,
available at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts
articles/2010/08/16/accused-craigslist killeran_apparent-suicide inboston_
jailcell/.
89. See Fox NEWS.COM, POLICE HUNTING FOR BOSTON 'CRAIGSLIST' KILLER
(Apr.16, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,516695,00.html; see also
Greta Van Susteren, CraigslistKiller?, Fox ON THE RECORD WITH GRETA VAN

April 16, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 7178914.
90. See ANOTHER HEARING IN CASE OF SUSPECTED 'CRAIGSLIST KILLER'
(June 23, 2009), http://multimedia.boston.com/m/23171917/another-hearingin-case-of-suspected-craigslist-killer.htm
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
92. See Christine L. Ruva & Cathy McEvoy, Negative and Positive
Pretrial Publicity Affect Juror Memory and Decision Making, 14 J.
SUSTEREN,

EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 226 (2008).

93. Id.
94. Christine Ruva, Cathy McEvoy & Judith Becker Bryant, Effects of
Pre-TrialPublicity and Jury Deliberationon JurorBias and Source Memory
Errors,21 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 45 (2007) [hereinafter Ruva et al.].

95.
96.
97.

Ruva & McEvoy, supra note 92 at 234.
Id.
Id.
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being used as if it were evidence, which it is not.
During voir dire, the jurors are asked whether they can be
fair and impartial and are asked to lay aside any extraneous
information that may cause the juror to be biased. 98 However,
research shows that jurors are unable to be fair and impartial
after being exposed to pretrial publicity, even when asked to lay
aside any information they have heard about the trial. 99 Because
the juror experiences source-memory errors and have already
formed a negative impression of the defendant, they are likely to
remain biased regardless of their promise to be fair and
impartial.10 0 Thus, instructions to lay aside information learned
are ineffective in cases where pretrial
of outside of the courtroom
10 1
publicity is an issue.
Moreover, jurors who have been exposed to pretrial publicity
are also biased in the way that they view the evidence. 10 2 After
hearing the negative pretrial publicity about the defendant, jurors
are more likely to have a built-in pro-prosecution bias where they
In
will evaluate the prosecution's case more favorably. 10 3
in
a
and
evidence
addition, the jurors may evaluate testimony
04
distorted manner to favor the prosecution. 1 Thus, even evidence
into being prothat is seemingly pro-defense may be distorted
05
prosecution in the eyes of the biased juror. 1
Regardless of a juror's promise to remain impartial and the
judge's admonition to overlook the news stories, jurors might
06
involuntarily decide the defendant's fate in a partial manner.1
Therefore, once a potential juror learns what the media is saying
about the defendant, that juror is essentially tainted. Most
importantly, these biases are mostly inadvertent and even
unknown to the juror(s); 10 7 therefore, it is likely that it will be

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

JONAKAIT, supra note 29, at 129.
See Ruva & McEvoy, supra note 92 at 234.
See id.
See id.
Lorraine Hope, Amina Memon & Peter McGeorge, Understanding

PretrialPublicity: Predecisional;Distortionof Evidence by Mock Jurors,10 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111 (2004) [hereinafter Hope et al.].

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See Ruva & McEvoy, supra note 92 at 234.
Id.
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difficult for an attorney, acting alone, to detect these biases during
voir dire.
B. Procedural Remedies for Pretrial Publicity
Courts are equipped with a variety of procedural tools that
may be used in order to combat pretrial publicity.10 8 These
techniques include gag orders, continuances, sequestration, jury
Although judges and
instructions, and change of venue. 10 9
prosecutors generally have the opinion that these remedies are
effective in ensuring a fair and impartial trial, 110 many of the
procedures have serious inadequacies that make employing them
onerous and that fail to adequately protect the defendant's
On the other hand, it has been said that many judges
rights.'
believe voir dire is an appropriate and sufficient remedy for
weeding out prejudiced jurors from the venire.ll 2 In addition, the
United States Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the
jury in cases
importance of voir dire in selecting an impartial
13
occurred.1
has
publicity
pretrial
where extensive
1. The Inadequaciesof Current ProceduralRemedies
a. Gag Orders
A court may issue a gag order in order to curtail information
leaks from trial participants in an attempt to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 1 4 Gag orders may be issued

108. See Sheppard v. Maxwell 384 U.S. 333, 356-62 (1966) (recommending
procedures the lower court should have employed to reduce the effects of
pretrial publicity).
109. See generally Jaime N. Morris, Note, The Anonymous Accused:
ProtectingDefendants'Rights in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REV.
901, 906-15 (2003).
110. John S. Carroll, Norbert L. Kerr, James J. Alfini, Frances M.
Weaver, Robert J. MacCoun & Valerie Feldman, Free Press and Fair Trial:
The Role of Behavioral Research, 10 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 187, 192 (1986)
[hereinafter Carroll et al.].
111. See infra Part II.B.1.
112. Norbert L. Kerr, Geoffrey P. Kramer, John S. Carroll & James J.
Alfini, On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial
Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 665, 667 (1991)
[hereinafter Kerr et al.].
113. See infra Part II.B.2.
114. Morris, supra note 109, at 906-07.
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where "there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial publicity
may prevent a fair trial."' 15 An appeals court may reverse a trial
court that fails to issue a gag order where a defendant's right to a
fair trial is threatened by pretrial publicity. 116 For this reason, it
seems that gag orders are believed to be an effective means of
protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial consistent with due
process.
Standing alone, a gag order will not shield the jury from
learning of pretrial publicity. This is because gag orders are most
often requested after the pretrial publicity has begun.' 17 Thus,
gag orders protect prospective leaks from occurring, but fail to
remedy leaks that have already occurred. Furthermore, gag
orders do not prohibit the media from reporting regarding the
case, 118 but merely silence their well-informed sources. 119 The
media's constant desire to "get the story" combined with a lack of
knowledgeable non-gagged sources leads to printing rumors and
misinformation. 120
Thus, gag orders are independently
115.

Id. at 906.

For instance, in the highly publicized prosecution of

Providence Mayor Vincent A. Cianci Jr. for corruption, U.S. District Court

Judge Ernest C. Torres issued a gag order. Tracy Breton, Operation Plunder
Dome: Judge Acts to Silence All Talk in Case, PROVIDENCE J., May 16, 2001,
at 1A. The mayor, his five co-defendants, their lawyers, the prosecutors, all
potential witnesses, law-enforcement officials, and court personnel were all
prohibited from making any extrajudicial statements concerning information
outside of the public record and from making any comments about the case in
general. Id. Judge Torres noted that "[tihe purpose of [the gag] order is to
protect the rights of both the defendants and the United States to a fair trial
before an impartial jury by prohibiting the kinds of extrajudicial statements
and disclosures that, if widely disseminated, would be likely to threaten those
rights and the integrity of the trial process." Id.
116. See e.g. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966). The
defendant, a prominent doctor, was accused of beating his pregnant wife to
death while she was asleep in their home. Id. at 335-36. The media became
preoccupied with this tragedy from day one, publishing stories regarding
evidence not presented at trial and information that blatantly incriminated
Sheppard. Id. at 356-57. The Supreme Court held that the trial court should
have employed precautions that would have protected Sheppard's right to a
fair trial, including the issuance of a gag order. Id. at 361.
117. Mark J. Geragos, The Thirteenth Juror: Media Coverage of
Supersized Trials, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1167, 1182 (2006).
118. See id. at 1182-83. The First Amendment of the United States
Constitution protects freedom of speech; thus, the courts cannot prohibit the
media from reporting on trials. See U.S.CONST. amend. I.
119. See Geragos, supra note 117, at 1182-83.
120. Id. at 1183.
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insufficient and inadequate to protect a defendant's right to a fair
trial.
b. Continuances
Continuances are a procedural tool that courts use in a
variety of circumstances, including in cases where pretrial
publicity has occurred. 12 1 In an effort to preserve the defendant's
122
rights, judges may postpone trial until the publicity subsides.
By definition, 123 continuances delay the trial, and any delay can
undoubtedly be detrimental to both parties. 124 Because delays can
be detrimental to both sides, continuances are by no means a
perfect remedy for pretrial publicity. Moreover, continuances may
not be very successful in ameliorating bias because the publicity
may be reborn once the trial starts up again.
c. Sequestration
Sequestering the jury is another remedial measure that the
court may utilize in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair
Sequestration involves isolating the jury from
trial. 125
extrajudicial information, thereby keeping publicity from
penetrating the jury box during trial. 126 Of course, this does not
prevent the jury from being tainted by publicity that occurs prior
to trial. 127 More importantly, sequestration thrusts an enormous
burden on the jurors by isolating them from their everyday life for

121. See Robert S. Stephen, PrejudicialPublicity Surroundinga Criminal
Trial: What a Trial Court Can Do To Ensure a Fair Trial in the Face of a
"MediaCircus," 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1063 (1992).
122. See e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (discussing
the failure of the lower court to take appropriate measures to protect the
defendant's right to a fair trial, namely failing to grant a continuance until
the publicity abated).
123. "The adjournment or postponement of a trial or other proceeding to a
future date." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 141 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
124. See e.g. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 15 (1983).
125. See e.g. Charles H. Whitebread & Darrel W. Contreras, Free Press v.

FairTrial: Protecting the CriminalDefendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized
Trial by Applying the Sheppard-MuMin Remedy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1587,
1612-15 (1996); see also Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363 (noting that the trial court
should have ordered sequestration sua sponte).
126. Morris, supra note 109, at 912.
127. Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 125, at 1612.
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considerable periods of time. 128
Sequestration is not only
ineffective at shielding the jurors from pretrial publicity, it is also
an inconvenient and extreme procedure; thus, sequestering the
jury is a defective remedy.
d. Jury Instructions
Judges may provide the jury with instructions admonishing
them not to consider any information relevant to the case that is
not presented at trial, such as information exposed by the
media. 129 Through the instructions, the judge reminds the jurors
that they must remain impartial throughout the trial in an
130
attempt to remedy any information learned prior to trial.
Judge Learned Hand criticized these instructions and pronounced
them to be a "recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic[,]
which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody[] else['s].''
Indeed, research confirms that Judge Hand's assessment is
132
correct; jury instructions in this situation are virtually useless.
e. Change of Venue
A trial judge is permitted to relocate a trial from an area,
which has been saturated with pretrial publicity to a district that
has not been exposed to such publicity. 133 Nevertheless, under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court cannot transfer a
case sua sponte. 134
Where a criminal case has received
128. See Commonwealth v. Hayes, 414 A.2d 318, 348 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (sequestration is extremely burdensome because it is expensive
and inconvenient).
129. See e.g. Newton N. Minnow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial
Jurorin an Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 648 (1991).
130. Morris, supra note 109, at 911.
131. Nash v. U.S., 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (1932).
132. See e.g. Ruva & McEvoy, supra note 92, at 234.
133. See e.g. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of a change of venue;
however, the Court has noted that "where there is a reasonable likelihood
that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should
...
transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity." Id.
134. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 21. Presumably, this is because under the
Constitution, the defendant has a right to be tried in the district where the
crime was committed, and a change of venue may deprive the defendant of
this right. See e.g., Scott Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right

to an ImpartialJury: Resolving the Conflict in the Federal Constitution,52 U.
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substantial pretrial publicity, the defendant may move for a
change of venue. 135 If the motion is granted, the case will be
transferred to another district that has not encountered
substantial pretrial publicity. 136 The underlying rationale for
change of venue is that by relocating the trial to a district where
the pretrial publicity is not as pervasive, 137 the jury will be able to
render a fair verdict because they have not been exposed to as
much publicity. 138 Change of venue is a great remedy where the
publicity is localized and the trial is moved to a place outside of
the publicity radius. On the other hand, where cases receive
pervasive nationwide publicity, a change of venue would be a

futile remedy.
2. Voir Dire: The TraditionalRemedy for JurorBias
Voir dire is a remedy for juror bias; thus, it is also viewed as a
remedy for pretrial publicity. During voir dire, 139 the potential
jurors are questioned in an effort to determine their competence
and whether they are harboring any potentially damaging
biases. 140
Questions concern the "potential juror's occupation,

CHI. L. REV. 729, 731-34 (1985).
135. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a). The defendant must convince the court that
the prejudice against him is so great in the district where the prosecution is
pending that he would be unable to obtain a fair trial there. Id. Many times,
the evidentiary support of prejudice is only found following the completion of
voir dire, thus it is a strategic decision about when to raise. Vineet R.
Shahani, Comment, Change the Motion, Not the Venue: A CriticalLook at the
Change of Venue Motion, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 107-08 (2005). Once the
court is "satisfied that so great a prejudice against the defendant exists," the
court must transfer to another district. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a).
136. See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 125, at 1604.
137. Many times, this will mean a different district within the same state;
however, courts have transferred prosecutions to a different state entirely.
See e.g. U.S. v. McVeigh, 918 F.Supp. 1467 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (upholding the
change of venue for the trial of Timothy McVeigh from Oklahoma to Colorado
following the infamous bombing in Oklahoma City). Moreover, instead of
moving the entire trial, a trial court may be permitted to bring in a jury from
another district. See e.g. State v. Harris, 660 A.2d 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995)
(trial court brought in a jury from another county to remedy localized pretrial
publicity).
138. See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 125, at 1604.
139. Voir dire is French for "to speak the truth." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
746 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
140. See Morris, supra note 109, at 910.
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14 1
family, education, prior convictions, and knowledge of the case."'
The answers to the questions theoretically provide the attorneys
with the information necessary to decide whether or not to strike a
particular juror. 142 The underlying principle of voir dire lies
within the Sixth Amendment, 143 in guaranteeing criminal
defendants the right to a trial by an impartial jury. 144
Over two hundred years ago, in United States v. Burr, the
Circuit Court for the District of Virginia was first confronted with
the issue of juror bias as a result of the media. 145 The court noted
that, in judging juror impartiality, the focus should not be on the
extent of knowledge possessed by the juror; rather, "[t]he question
must always depend on the strength and nature of the opinion
which has been formed."'146 Thus, the court placed an emphasis on
discovering biases during voir dire, underscoring their belief in the
efficacy and importance of voir dire. That belief was reaffirmed
seventy years later in Reynolds v. United States, 14 7 when the U.S.
Supreme Court held -that impermissible juror bias occurs when
media coverage leads a juror to form an opinion prior to
deliberation. 148 The Court reasoned, "a juror who has formed an

141. Id.
142. See Whitebread & Contreras, supranote 125, at 1600.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
144. Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 125, at 1600.
145. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,
692g). Aaron Burr was accused of treason after he stepped down from his
position as vice president and planned to conquer territories in the west.
Robert Hardaway & Douglas B. Tumminello, PretrialPublicity in Criminal
Cases of National Notoriety: Constructing a Remedy for the Remediless
Wrong, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 39, 48 (1996). Given his prominence and the
circumstances surrounding the offense, Burr's case received a lot of media
attention. Id. Burr claimed that the jurors who had previously learned the
facts of the case through the media should be disqualified in order to avoid
any prejudice. Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 125, at 1601. The Court,
led by Chief Justice John Marshall, held that the jurors were not
automatically disqualified because they learned about the case through the
media since knowledge is not entirely dispositive of a juror's ability to act
impartially. Id.
146. Burr, 25 F.Cas. at 51.
147. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
148. Id. at 155. Thus, a finding of bias must be based upon evidence that
the juror formed an opinion prior to deliberation; however, the reviewing
court should only set aside the finding of bias if the error is manifest. Id. at
156.
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4
opinion cannot be impartial."1
Almost a whole century later, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Irvin v. Dowd, further shaped the standard of juror impartiality
by recognizing the presumption of prejudice. 5 ° In holding that
the defendant was deprived of due process, the Supreme Court
noted "the right to [a] jury trial guarantees to the criminally
5
'1
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors."'
Impartiality is satisfied so long as the juror can lay aside his
opinion. 152 However, the juror's promise to be impartial is not
dispositive, and the defendant must show "the actual existence of
such an opinion on the mind of the juror as will raise the
presumption of partiality" in order for the juror to be set aside. 153

In determining juror bias, the Supreme Court employed a
two-pronged test considering both the media saturation in the
community and voir dire. 154 First looking at the setting, the Court
considered the fact that it was a small, rural community and that
the publicity was fairly substantial, even extending into the
neighboring county. 155 Second, the statements the jurors made on
voir dire, taken as a whole, convinced the Court that the jury was
not impartial. 1 56 Given that two-thirds of the jury admitted to
presuming the defendant's guilt before hearing any of the
testimony, the Supreme Court found the jurors to be prejudiced to
149.

Id.

150.

See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 125, at 1601; see also Irvin

v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961). The defendant faced considerable pretrial
publicity concerning the six murders he was accused of committing. Id. at
721. The media attention included an intensively publicized press release
issued by the prosecutor and police officials announcing that the defendant
had confessed to all six murders. Id. at 719-20. The motion for a transfer of
venue was granted; however, the case was transferred to the adjacent county,
which had also been exposed to the inflammatory publicity. Id. at 720. The
defendant's subsequent motions for a change of venue were denied. Id.
Following a conviction, the defendant instituted habeas corpus proceedings
arguing that he was denied a fair trial and, therefore, denied due process. Id.
at 719.
151. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722. The jurors do not need to be completely
ignorant of the events and issues surrounding the defendant's arrest; rather,
they need to be impartial. Id.
152. Id. at 723.
153. Id.
154. See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 125, at 1601; see also Irvin,
366 U.S. at 717.
155. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725-26.
156. Id. at 726-28.
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a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible.1 57 Once again, the
Supreme Court emphasized the value of voir dire.
In Rideau v. Louisiana the Supreme Court held that the
publicity surrounding the trial was pervasive and, therefore, was
158
sufficient to give rise to a presumption of prejudice.
Consequently, the Court did not inspect the voir dire transcript for
actual prejudice. 159 However, this analysis was subsequently
abandoned just ten years later in Murphy v. Florida.160 The
Supreme Court articulated another test to determine juror bias,
looking for "any indications in the totality of the circumstances
that the petitioner's trial was not fundamentally unfair." 16 1 In
looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Court considered:
(1) the voir dire transcript in search of any juror hostility; (2) the
general atmosphere in the community or courtroom at the time of
the trial court had to go in
the trial; and (3) the length to which
62
order to choose impartial jurors. 1
In Murphy, the Supreme Court looked to the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether the jury was impartial,
163
identifying one of the factors as the voir dire transcript.
157.

Id. at 728.

158. 373 U.S. 723, 1420 (1963); Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 125,
at 1601.
159. See Cheryl A. Waddle, Note, MuMin v. Virginia: Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments Do Not Compel Content Questions in Assessing
Juror Impartiality, 25 AKRON L. REV. 479, 483 (1991); see also Rideau, 373
U.S. at 1420.
160. See 421 U.S. 794, 795 (1975). The defendant, a notorious jewel thief,
was convicted of breaking and entering of a home and of assault with intent
to commit robbery. Id. The defendant appealed his conviction arguing that
the jury had learned of his prior convictions through the media and therefore
he was denied a fair trial. Id. at 799. Although the Supreme Court held that
the publicity surrounding Murphy's trial was pervasive, the Court held that
the judicial control over the outside influences was sufficient to deny the
presumption of prejudice. Id.
161. Id.
162. Hardaway & Tumminello, supra note 145, at 61; Murphy, 421 U.S.
at 800-03. After considering these factors, the Court found no due process
violation because the jurors were sufficiently impartial. Id. at 803. Although
there was pretrial publicity causing some jurors to become aware of the
defendant's prior convictions, the Supreme Court found that these jurors
were impartial because they were able to put aside any personal impressions
or opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence in court. Id. at 800.
"We must distinguish between mere familiarity with petitioner or his past
and an actual predisposition against him." Id.
163. Id. at 800.
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Specifically, the Supreme Court noted they were looking for any
indication that the empanelled jurors demonstrated a hostility
164
that "suggest[ed] a partiality that could not be laid aside."'
Thus, it is clear that eliciting such hostility during voir dire is a
significant factor in determining impartiality, but just how that
hostility could be elicited was unclear after Murphy.
Subsequently, in Mu Min v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
established the standard for uncovering potential juror bias
during voir dire. 16 5 Following substantial pretrial publicity and a
conviction, the defendant appealed arguing that he had a
constitutional right to question the jurors about the content of the
news reports that they heard or read and, therefore, the trial
judge erred in prohibiting defendant from engaging in such
questioning.1 66 The Supreme Court held that the due process
clause does not require potential jurors to be questioned regarding
the amount and content of news reports to which they have been
exposed where there has been extensive pretrial publicity. 167 In
order for content questions to be considered required by due
process, the defendant must show that "the trial court's failure to
ask these questions must render the defendant's trial
16 8
fundamentally unfair."
164. Id.
165. See 500 U.S. 415 (1991). While Dawud Majid Mu'Min was serving
his forty-eight year sentence for first-degree murder, he committed a second
murder during a prison furlough program. Id. at 418. The media extensively
covered the homicide and most of the media accounts were fairly prejudicial
to the defendant. Id.
One or more of the articles discussed details of the murder and
investigation, and included information about petitioner's prior
criminal record, the fact that he had been rejected for parole six
times, accounts of alleged prison infractions, details about the prior
murder for which Mu'Min was serving his sentence at the time of
this murder, a comment that the death penalty had not been
available when Mu'Min was convicted for this earlier murder, and
indications that Mu'Min had confessed...
Id. The potential jurors were questioned during voir dire regarding whether
they had read or heard the publicity regarding the case and whether the
information from outside sources would affect their ability to be impartial.
Id. at 419-20. Eight of the twelve empanelled jurors admitted during voir
dire to either having read or heard something about the case from an outside
source, but none admitted to forming an opinion about the case. Id. at 421.
166. Id. at 419, 421.
167. Id. at 425.
168. Id. at 425-26. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that questioning the
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The focus should be on whether the potential juror has formed
1 69
an opinion that would impair the juror's ability to be impartial.
Only where unfavorable pretrial publicity saturates a community
to the extent that a presumption of prejudice is established,
should a juror's pledge to be impartial be questioned. 7 0 The trial
judge has broad discretion in determining the extent of
questioning during voir dire, 17 1 but it is evident that, after
MuMin, a defendant is only entitled to question a potential juror
regarding whether he or she can remain impartial in spite of being
exposed to pretrial publicity. 172 While content questions are not
necessarily prohibited during voir dire, a trial judge is well within
his right to deny a defendant the chance to ask such questions.
In fashioning a standard for determining jury bias, it seems
the Supreme Court has put much emphasis on voir dire and jury
selection. Indeed, a trial court is to determine impartiality during
voir dire and an appellate court is to look at the totality of the
circumstances, including the voir dire transcript. 173 The Court in
Murphy paid close attention to the voir dire transcript to
determine whether any jurors were biased. 174 Moreover, Mu'Min
made it clear that establishing impartiality occurred during voir
dire and not by asking content questions. 175 Thus, it is clear that
jury selection plays a central role in the criminal trials where
there has been considerable pretrial publicity.
Traditionally, judges and attorneys have completed jury
selection; however, attorneys are turning to jury consultants with
increasing frequency.17 6 Indigent defendants have requested the
expertise of jury consultants under the due process right to expert
jurors regarding the content of the publicity might be helpful, but that
helpfulness is insufficient to establish a constitutional compulsion. Id. at
425.
169. Id. at 430 (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 (1984)). "The
relevant question is not whether the community remembered the case, but
whether the jurors .

.

. had such fixed opinions that they could not judge

impartially the guilt of the defendant." Id.
170. Id. at 429.
171. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 428 (1991) (relying on Patton,
467 U.S. at 1031).
172. Id. at 431-32.
173. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975).
174. Id.
175. See MuMin, 500 U.S. at 431-32.
176. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 464.
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assistance; unfortunately, most requests have been denied.1 77
Ill. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EXPERT ASSISTANCE
A. The Foundations of Ake v. Oklahoma
Under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the
United States Supreme Court has found that a criminal defendant
is entitled to certain procedures and protections. 178 This is often
termed the fundamental fairness doctrine. 179
Fundamental
fairness requires that a capital defendant be appointed counsel to
ensure that the defendant is afforded a fair trial."8 This right has
since been extended to state court proceedings,1 8 1 82
and to
misdemeanor cases that are punishable by imprisonment. 1
Although the objective of the right to counsel is to ensure
criminal defendants a fair trial, assistance by counsel alone may
not always guarantee a fair trial. 183 The majority of criminal
defendants are indigent. 8 4 Combine this statistic with the fact
that most trials necessitate expert assistance,18 5 and it becomes
evident why the right to counsel alone may not be enough to
guarantee a fair trial. 186
Thus, the Supreme Court has
progressively recognized that indigent defendants require greater
procedural protections than simply the right to appointed
counsel. 187 In accordance with this progression, the Supreme

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See infra Part IV.

184.

See

Serio, supra note 2, at1167-69.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 306 (3d 2006).
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 24, 37 (1972).
Serio, supra note 2, at 1168.
MYRON

MOSKOVITZ,

CASES

AND

PROBLEMS

IN

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE: THE COURTROOM 779 (4th ed. 2004) (estimating that over 90% of
criminal defendants are indigent).
185. See Serio, supra note 2, at 1168-70.
186. 'The best lawyer in the world cannot competently defend an accused
person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to the defense,
e.g., if the defendant cannot pay the fee of an investigator to find a pivotal
missing witness or a necessary document, or that of an expert accountant or
mining engineer or chemist ...In such circumstances, if the government does
not supply the funds, justice is denied the poor-and represents but an upper
bracket privilege." United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (1956)
(Frank, J., dissenting).
187. See e.g. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (holding that an
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Court established
the right to expert assistance in Ake v.
88
Oklahoma.1

B. Ake v. Oklahoma and the Subsequent Expansion of the Right
to an Expert
Glen Burton Ake, an indigent defendant, was charged with
capital murder. 189 Ake raised an insanity defense and could not
afford to pay for a psychiatrist; thus, his court-appointed attorney
filed a motion requesting that the trial court appoint a
psychiatrist or provide funds that would enable Ake to obtain a
psychiatrist. 190 Despite Ake's arguments that the Constitution
required the court to provide him with the assistance of a
psychiatrist when that assistance is necessary for his defense, the
19 1
court refused to provide a state funded psychiatric evaluation.
Ake was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. 192 On appeal,
Ake argued that the trial court erred in failing to appoint a
psychiatrist. 193 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the Constitution required the trial court
to provide a psychiatrist's assistance because the defendant had
time of the offense was likely
demonstrated that his sanity at the
94
1
trial.
at
factor
significant
to be a
In writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Marshall based
the holding on "the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
guarantee of fundamental fairness."'195 At the outset of the
opinion, Justice Marshall summarized the Court's expansion of
indigent defendant is entitled to a copy of his trial transcript because he has
the right to adequate appellate review); see also Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
states to provide an indigent defendant with the means to raise a meaningful
appeal because indigent defendants should have an equal opportunity as that
possessed by a wealthy defendant). In addition, an indigent defendant is
entitled to effective assistance of counsel to ensure an adequate defense. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); see also McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
188. See 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985) (holding that the denial of a state funded
psychiatrist deprived the defendant of due process).
189. Id. at 70.
190. Id. at 72.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 73.
194. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985).
195. Id. at 76.
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196
indigent defendants' rights over the previous thirty years.
Justice Marshall went on to note that a state must ensure that the
defendant is afforded "an adequate opportunity" to present a
defense. 19 7 To implement this policy, the state must supply the
indigent defendant with the "basic tools of an adequate defense or
appeal."'19 8
In order to determine whether a psychiatric
evaluation was a basic tool necessary for Ake's defense, the Court
applied the three-factor test from Matthews v. Eldridge.199 The
Matthews test considers: (1) the private interest that will be
affected by the action of the state; (2) the governmental interest
that will be affected if the protection is provided; and (3) the
probable value of the additional or substitute procedural
protections sought and the risk of an erroneous deprivation should
the protections be withheld. 0 0
In applying the factors, the Court found that a criminal
defendant's interest in potentially losing his life or liberty was
"uniquely compelling." 20 1 Moreover, the Court found the state's
asserted fiscal interest to be unpersuasive and "not
substantial. 2 2
The discussion regarding the third factor,
however, was not as concise as the first two factors, which the
Court had answered summarily. 20 3 The Court weighed the
probable value of the psychiatric assistance sought against the

196. Id. (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351, U.S. 12 (1956) (right to receive trial
transcript if necessary for appeal); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985)
(assistance of counsel must be effective); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) (same); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (same);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to assistance of counsel);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to assistance of counsel on
first direct appeal); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (right to appeal
without paying a filing fee).
197. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
198. Id. (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971)).
199. Id.; Matthews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
200. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335).
201. Id. at 78.
202. Id. at 78-79. The State argued that providing psychiatric assistance
in this case would be an overwhelming financial burden. Id. The Court
rejected this argument as to indigent defendants in general and as to Ake in
light of the compelling interest. Id.
203. See id. at 79-83; see also John M. West, Note, Expert Services and the

Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v.
Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1333 (1986).
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risk of erroneous deprivation should the assistance be denied.2 °4
The Court determined that supplying the defendant with the
psychiatric assistance would "dramatically enhance]" the jury's
accuracy in the determination of guilt and sentencing. 20 5 An
evaluation by a psychiatrist was central to the defendant's
insanity defense; thus, the Court declared that psychiatric
assistance was a "significant factor." 20 6 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court held that Ake was entitled to a state funded expert. 207
Although the opinion in Ake dealt exclusively with an
appointed
right
to an
criminal
defendant's
indigent
20 8
many courts have read Ake's language broadly,
psychiatrist,
thereby extending the right of expert assistance to include other
types of experts. 20 9 For instance, the Eighth Circuit held that a
defendant's right to a fair trial was violated when the state failed
to provide him with a hypnosis expert. 210 The Eighth Circuit
noted that Ake does not require drawing a decisive line between a
psychiatric expert and a non-psychiatric expert because the focus
ought to be on the necessity of the expert. 2 1 1 Many other courts
have followed suit by providing experts in other areas, such as:
2 13 DNA, 2 1 4 fingerprinting, 2 15
forensic pathology,2 12 blood spatter,
intoxication 2 16 and dentistry. 2 17 Rather than confining Ake to the
204. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
205. Id. at 83.
206. Id. "[Wihen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his
sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist
who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation, and presentation of the defense." Id.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. Serio, supra note 2, at 1172.
210. See Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987).
211. Id. at 1243. "There is no principled way to distinguish between
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts. The question in each case must be
not what field of science or expert knowledge is involved, but rather how
important the scientific issue is in the case, and how much help a defense
expert could have given." Id. In fact, the Eighth Circuit noted that there
should be no distinction between a capital and noncapital crime because a
liberty interest is compelling of due process as well. Id. at 1243-44.
212. See e.g., Ray v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
213. See e.g., James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind.1993).
214. See e.g., Exparte Dubose, 662 So.2d 1189, 1194 (Ala. 1995).
215. See e.g., State v. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d 337, 390 (N.C. 1989).
216. See e.g., State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1987).
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psychiatric experts discussed in the opinion, these courts read the
opinion as a means for ensuring defendant is provided with the
"basic tools to an adequate defense." 218 Accordingly, this comment
argues that Ake should be extended to jury consultants as well.
IV. UNDER THE AKE STANDARD, INDIGENT CAPITAL DEFENDANTS
SHOULD BE AFFORDED A JURY CONSULTANT WHERE THERE HAS BEEN
EXTENSIVE PRETRIAL PUBLICITY

Since courts have further expanded the right to expert
assistance across the country, indigent defendants have attempted
to obtain the assistance of jury consultants under this
fundamental fairness analysis. Defendants are rarely successful
in obtaining a jury consultant; 219 however, defendants have been
successful in a few cases. 22 0 Most of these requests fail because
the court finds that the defendant has failed to establish the
"significant factor" requirement asserted in Ake v. Oklahoma.22 1
However, it seems that many times these decisions fail to account
for the compelling factor of pretrial publicity. Moreover, these
decisions have been inconsistently decided and have been based
upon language that is curiously absent from the Ake v. Oklahoma
opinion. 222 Jury consultants satisfy the Matthews three-factor test
217.
See e.g., Thornton v. State, 339 S.E.2d 240, 241 (Ga. 1986).
218. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
219.
See e.g., Moore v. Johnson, 225 F.3d 495, 502-03 (5th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the defendant was not entitled to a state-funded jury
consultant); see also Jackson v. Anderson, 141 F.Supp.2d 811, 854 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (holding that defendant was not denied a fair trial because he was not
afforded a jury consultant).
Judge Diane Kottmyer refused to grant
defendant Neil Entwistle a jury consultant because "it had never been done
before, so she didn't have to do it now. She never addressed the actual merits
of affording . . . this procedural protection . . ." Scott H. Greenfield, The
Indigent Defendant's Right to a Jury Consultant, http://blog.simplejustice.us/
2008/06/05/the-indigent-defendants-right-to-a-jury-consultant.aspx (June 05,
2008, 17:20 EST).
220. See e.g., Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 360,369 (Cal. 1984)
(indigent defendant granted a jury consultant because of excessive pretrial
publicity). "In a recent highly publicized capital murder case here, the two
defendants in the so-called Cemetery Case each received court-appointed
attorneys, private investigators, jury consultants, psychologists and
mitigation specialists." Lawrence Buser, Indigents' Plea for Experts Stirs
Issues of Cost, Fairness,THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 4,
1996, at Al.
221.
Serio, supra note 2, at 1177-79.
222. See id.
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incorporated in the Ake v. Oklahoma test, and they should also
satisfy the "significant factor" requirement if pretrial publicity is
taken into account.
A. The Matthews Factors
The first factor looks to the private interest affected by the
state's action. 223 A criminal defendant charged with a felony faces
potential jail time, which is an undeniable liberty interest.
Furthermore, a criminal defendant charged with a capital crime
faces much worse than a mere loss of liberty. Thus, it is easy to
see why Justice Marshall deemed a capital defendant's interest to
It is doubtful that a capital
be "uniquely compelling." 224
this
first prong, 22 5 given that his
would
fail
to
overcome
defendant
226
interest is "obvious and weighs heavily in [the] analysis."

Therefore, jury consultants would surely surpass the first prong of
the analysis where the defendant is charged with a capital crime.
The second factor of the test considers the state's interest that
will be affected should the jury consultant be provided.2 2 7 In Ake,
the Court considered the State's fiscal interest to be unpersuasive,
given that many states already provided expert assistance for
indigent defendants. 228 The Court reasoned that these states
clearly have not found the financial burden to be so great that
assistance is precluded entirely. 229 The state merely has 23to0
provide a competent expert, not the best available.
Furthermore, the state's interest in achieving a fair and accurate
231
verdict is, at most, equivalent with the defendant's interest.
Jury consultants would certainly be an added cost for the state.
223.
224.
225.

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
Id. at 78.
See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 741 (11th Cir. 1987) (Johnson,

C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that a defendant's

interest in a capital case almost certainly assure that he will pass the first
prong of the Ake analysis).
226. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
227. Id. at 77.
228. Id. at 79 n.4 (citing several state statutes that make expert
assistance available to indigent criminal defendants).
229. Id. at 78-79.
230. Id.
231. Id. (asserting that a state's interest in a fair and accurate verdict is
greater than a state's interest in winning at trial); Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d
702, 741 (11th Cir. 1987).
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However, cases receiving extensive pretrial publicity occur
periodically, but not incessantly. States would not be required to
provide jury consultants to every indigent defendant. Rather, only
certain indigent defendants would be entitled to a jury
consultant-those defendants whose cases demand, in fairness,
that the effects of excessive pretrial publicity be assuaged. Thus,
states would not be unduly burdened, especially in comparison
with a capital defendant, who faces a trial by a jury of biased
peers. Moreover, given the analysis in Ake, 232 it is unlikely that a
state's fiscal interest will outweigh a capital defendant's life and
liberty interests. Although a jury consultant would be an added
financial burden on states, it seems that jury consultants meet the
second prong of the Ake analysis.
The third prong requires an analysis of the probable value of
the assistance of a jury consultant as compared with the risk of
erroneous deprivation absent that assistance. 233 In Ake, the Court
analyzed this prong by considering the importance of psychiatry in
criminal proceedings and determined that psychiatric assistance
"has come to play a pivotal role in criminal proceedings." 234 While
jury consultants are often employed for services extending beyond
jury selection, a jury consultant's services often revolve around
jury selection. 2 35 Furthermore, jury selection is a significant
factor in capital cases because the jury determines whether or not
to request the death penalty. 236
Jury selection is even more critical where excessive pretrial
publicity has occurred. 237 Where the community has been exposed
to pretrial publicity, voir dire is an essential way to weed out any
biases. 238 Although there are other remedial measures for pretrial

232.

See Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.

233.

Id. at 77.

234.

Id. at 79.

235. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 455-56 (discussing that
when consultants reported an estimate of how much time they spend
providing each type of service, voir dire questions/strategy was ranked second
highest).
236. See Serio, supra note 2, at 1174.
237.
See supra Parts II.A and II.B.2 (discussing the psychological impacts
on pretrial publicity and the significance of voir dire where pretrial publicity
is pervasive).
238. See Ruva et al., supra note 94, at 61; see also Kerr et al., supra note
112, at 667.
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publicity, they are inadequate in protecting a defendant's right to
a fair trial.23 9 Moreover, lawyers and judges believe voir dire to be
a vital remedy for biases, including those resulting from pretrial
publicity. 240 If potential jurors are biased because of pretrial
publicity, they may contaminate the jury, unless they are struck
during voir dire. Thus, the potential jurors must be closely
examined for impartiality during voir dire.
In Ake, Justice Marshall noted that the assistance of a
psychiatrist was necessary to achieve a fair and accurate
verdict. 24 1 The Court focused on the consequence of erroneously
sentencing the defendant to death, which they considered to be a
considerable risk that substantially outweighed the slight burden
on the state. 24 2
Therefore, the Court found appointing 24a3
psychiatrist was mandated by fundamental fairness.
Psychiatry was crucial in ensuring the defendant a fair trial in
Ake.244 Likewise, jury selection is a vital part of ensuring
fundamental fairness in every case, 245 but especially so in capital
cases where pretrial publicity has occurred. Pretrial publicity
24 6
creates biases that may even be unknown to the juror himself
and, therefore, they can be difficult for an attorney to detect
during voir dire.
However, jury consultants can assist the
attorney and make uncovering biases more likely.
Jury
consultants are experienced in reading the body language and
responses given by jurors during voir dire. 247 Moreover, jury
consultants rely on more than just the facts in front of them
during voir dire; they rely on empirical evidence that may provide
insight into the jurors' minds. 248 Thus, jury consultants reduce
239.

See supra Part II.B.1.

240.
241.
242.

See Carroll et al., supra note 110 at 192.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82 (1985).
Id. at 84.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. See Debra Sahler, Comment, Scientifically Selecting Jurors While
MaintainingProfessionalResponsibility: A Proposed Model Rule, 6 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 383, 396 (1996) "Voir dire, or jury selection exists to ensure
that the jury is comprised of competent jurors who will weigh the evidence,
decide the facts, and assess a witness' credibility without bias, prejudice, or
partiality." Id.
246. See Ruva et al., supra note 94, at 61.
247. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 454.
248.

See id. at 452-53.
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the risk of having a biased jury, thereby protecting fundamental
fairness.
Jury consultants are more likely than attorneys to be able to
select an impartial jury. 249 Although the actual beneficial value of
jury consultants is hard to calculate in experiments, efficacy is
likely improved where jury consultants are employed.25 ° Merely
because the precise valuation of their efficacy is difficult to
determine, their beneficial value cannot be dismissed.2 5 1 Jury
consultants' scientific methods of selecting a jury are certainly
superior to that of an attorney relying merely on his own gut252
instinct and stereotypes.
A consultant's methods are specific to each case and location
by surveying the specific community from which the jury pool is
selected.2 53 By contrast, an attorney relying on instincts may be
case specific, but is not necessarily location specific. An attorney
may consider the relevant facts of the case when considering
whom he intuitively presumes will be sympathetic to his client.
However, considering the location at the time of the trial is likely
to be difficult for an attorney, unless he were to survey the
community himself. Jury consultants survey the community at
the time of the trial in order to gauge the local biases, which may
only be present temporarily, as a result of the defendant's alleged
acts. Attorneys acting alone, on the contrary, can only guess how
the community feels. Jury consultants collect this data because it
is important to consider the community's attitudes during jury
Without this important information, an attorney
selection.
selecting a jury on his own is certainly at a disadvantage.
Moreover, instead of simply relying on guesswork and
intuitions, a jury consultant relies upon objective data and

249. See e.g. Reid Hastie, Comment, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an
Effective Procedurefor the Selection of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV.
703, 719-20 (1990) (describing research showing that jury consultants'
scientific jury selection produces slightly better results than attorneys relying
on instincts); see also Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 459-60 (arguing
that the research surrounding jury consultants is very pessimistic and fails to
recognize the value of the modest increase in performance).
250. See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 464.

251.

Id.

252.
253.

See id. at 465-66.
Id. at 466.
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statistical analyses. 254 An attorney's instincts could be correct,
2 55
but they could also be based upon some inherent stereotype.
Jury consultants have made a career out of determining and
predicting human behavior. Through their relevant educational
background and experience, they learn how to collect and analyze
data in order to accurately evaluate the potential jurors. 25 6 Thus,
their selection choices are rooted in neutral statistics, rather than
mere speculation, and should be accorded more weight.
In determining the relevant value of a jury consultant, it is
important to consider the value that society accords it. 257 Indeed,
it is argued "it would betray great naivet6 to ignore the fact that
law firms and in-house counsel look increasingly to consultants for
pretrial preparation [and] jury selection.., notwithstanding both
the absence of any guarantee of victory and the immoderate cost of
the services." 258 The substantial amount of money attorneys are
willing to pay for a jury consultant is a fairly compelling
indication that jury consultants are effective. 259 The cost alone
reveals that there is value in the service. Presumably, people do
not throw away enormous sums of money for a worthless,
ineffective service they could have done better themselves.
Moreover, some argue, "over time the free market should weed out
the less effective consultants leaving attorneys with a product of
increasingly higher quality." 260 Regardless of the fact that there
is little conclusive data on the efficacy of jury consultants, the
increasing number of attorneys who rely on, and are willing to pay
for, their services indicates that there is considerable value in

254.
255.

Id.
See Hartje, supra note 44, at 497-501 (arguing that jury consultants

can help attorneys conform to Constitutional standards by decreasing the use

of stereotypes and racism during voir dire).
256. In fact, the use of surveys to compile data and predict the attitudes
of individuals in the venire has been found to be fairly effective and accurate.
Frederick, supra note 78, at 391.
257. Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 464-65 (arguing that the
value of a jury consultant can be estimated by looking at the market value of
the service).
258. Id. at 464.
259. Id. (arguing that attorneys would not waste $50 to $375 per hour on
an ineffective service).
260. Id. (quoting Dennis P. Stolle et al., The Perceived Fairness of the

Psychologist Trial Consultant: An Empirical Investigation, 20 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 146 (1996)).
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their assistance.

26 1

Without a jury consultant, a capital defendant who has
incurred extensive pretrial publicity is certainly at a high risk of
erroneous deprivation. "[Sltudies reveal that juries wrongfully
convict and sentence to death an inordinate number of capital
defendants." 262 Thus, a capital defendant faces a high risk of
erroneous deprivation to begin with; 263 the national rate of error
was sixty-eight percent between 1973 and 1995.264 Furthermore,
those studies were not constricted to just cases with pretrial
publicity, 265 which likely increases the risk of wrongful conviction.
Pretrial publicity substantially affects a juror's ability to remain
fair and impartial. 2 66 The juror may create a negative impression
of the defendant, 26 7 experience source-memory errors, 268 and
26 9
distort the evidence because of the pretrial publicity.
Consequently, a biased juror may vote to convict in a case that
lacked sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, capital defendants whose cases receive extensive
pretrial publicity likely have a high risk of erroneous deprivation.
That risk, however, could be reduced with the assistance of a jury
selection expert.
B. The "Significant Factor" Requirement
The Court in Ake noted that defendant's "sanity was a
significant factor at trial."2 7 This language has largely become
the usual reason for which indigent defendants are denied a jury
consultant. 27 1 It is argued; however, that these courts have
261.
262.

Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 39, at 464-65.
Serio, supra note 2, at 1144 (citing Dirk Johnson, Illinois Citing
Faulty Verdicts, Bar Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al).
263.
See id. In Illinois, 85 people were found to be wrongly convicted and

were released. Dirk Johnson, Illinois Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bar Executions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al.
264. James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jonathan Lloyd,

Capital Attrition: ErrorRates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1839, 1850 (2000).
265. See id.
266. See infra Part II.A.

267.

Ruva & McEvoy, supra note 92, at 234.

268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Hope et al., supra note 102, at 117.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
Serio, supranote 2, at 1177-78; see cases cited supranote 219.
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analyzed the "significant factor" requirement inconsistently.
These rigid interpretations contravene what the U.S. Supreme
Court envisioned concerning a defendant's right to expert
assistance. 2 73 Additionally, courts fail to adequately account for
the necessity of a jury consultant in light of excessive pretrial
publicity.
There are three different ways this language has been
analyzed and throughout all of them the focus is on the necessity
of a jury consultant to the defense. 2 74 Some courts interpret this
language to mean the defendant must show a "particularized
need" or a "substantial need" for the expert assistance he
requests. 275 Others courts construe it to require defendants to
establish that there is a reasonable probability that the jury a
consultant would assist in his defense and that a denial of this
assistance would result in an unfair trial.2 76 Additionally, other
courts believe the language demands that the assistance
constitute a "basic tool of an adequate defense." 2 77 However, these
supplementary phrases are curiously absent from the opinion in
Ake, 278 as is any indication that defendants must demonstrate
their need for an expert.
A more flexible Ake standard should be applied, rather than
the varying, rigid standards applied by the aforementioned courts.
A minority of courts have taken this accommodating approach.2 79
Applying a more flexible Ake standard bolsters the U.S. Supreme
280
Court's view of how expert assistance should be for defendants.
Capital cases should not be comprised by such rigid jurisprudence

272. Serio, supra note 2, at 1177-80.
273. See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 741 (11th Cir. 1987) (Johnson,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
274. Serio, supranote 2, at 1177-80.
275. Id. at 1178; see e.g., State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 469 (Tenn.
2002).
276. Serio, supra note 2, at 1178; see e.g., State v. Williams, 565 S.E.2d
609, 634 (N.C. 2002).
277. Serio, supra note 2, at 1178; see e.g., Moore v. Johnson, 225 F.3d 495,
503 (5th Cir. 2000).
278. See Serio, supra note 2, at 1178-81.
279. See e.g., Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1984); see
also Grayson v. State, 806 So. 2d 241, 255 (Miss. 2001).
280. See Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 741 (11th Cir. 1987) (Johnson,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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because malleable standards suit capital cases better.2"' Indeed,
it has been urged that trial courts should view motions for jury
consultants with "considerable liberality." 282 The rigid standards
that the majority of courts have implemented make it near
impossible for a defendant to be afforded the assistance of a jury
consultant. However, jury consultants would pass the "significant
requirement" language under a less rigid interpretation of Ake.
Additionally, jury consultants likely satisfy the rigid standards
where there has been excessive pretrial publicity, since this factor
should qualify as rising to the level of a "particularized need."
However, in following the rigid application of the Ake
"significant factor" requirement, courts have failed to adequately
consider pretrial publicity. Courts requiring a defendant to show
the necessity for a jury consultant should consider the impact of
pretrial publicity on a defendant's right to a fair trial. If a capital
defendant can show that there has been excessive pretrial
publicity, he should be able to meet this strict necessity standard.
Pretrial publicity increases the chance of a biased venire,283 and a
jury consultant is more likely to be effective in weeding out biased
jurors during voir dire than an attorney. Thus, capital defendants
subject to such pretrial publicity necessitate the assistance of a
jury consultant in order to preserve the defendant's right to an
impartial jury. Jury consultants help to effectively choose an
impartial jury, which preserves fundamental fairness.
CONCLUSION

At least one court has granted an indigent defendant a jury
consultant to assuage the effects of pretrial publicity. 284 However,
several others have denied the defendant's request and forced him
to face the biased venire alone. Fundamental fairness demands
that jury consultants be appointed to indigent capital defendants
where pretrial publicity is pervasive. This is especially true with
defendants charged with capital crimes, as it is literally a matter
of life or death. Until courts begin to recognize this, defendants in

281.

Id.

282. People v. Shannon, No. E029170, 2002 WL 973198 at *6 (Cal. App.
4th May 13, 2002).
See generally Ruva & McEvoy, supra note 92.
283.
284.
Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 360, 368 (Cal. 1984).
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these circumstances will be denied due process.

